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1 Introduction
The impact of labor market reforms on unemployment and economic growth has been
the focus of a large theoretical and empirical literature. From an analytical perspective,
important issues in that context are the modeling of the production structure and the
causes of mismatches between supply and demand in the labor market. Accounting for
innovation activities for instance is critical to study the role of human capital accumu-
lation, knowledge externalities, and the distribution of skills as sources of growth and
employment; and modeling labor market rigidities (both economic and institutional) is
essential to explain unemployment. These rigidities have taken the form of government
legislation on minimum wages, mandated ring costs, unemployment benets, payroll
taxes (Daveri and Tabellini (2000)), collective bargaining (Varga et al. (2014), Bhat-
tacharyya and Gupta (2015) and Chang and Hung (2016)), search and matching frictions
in the Mortensen-Pissarides tradition (Zagler (2009) and Cacciatore and Fiori (2016)),
and e¢ ciency wages (van Schaik and de Groot (2000), Meckl (2001, 2004), Bucci et al.
(2003), Parello (2011), and Zagler (2011)).1 A key result from the literature is that the
relationship between growth and unemployment may be weak, both in the short run and
in the long run.
However, the existing literature su¤ers from four major shortcomings. First, except
for a few contributions such as Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), albeit in a business cycle
setting most of the literature neglects transitional dynamics. As a result, the dynamic
trade-o¤s that may be associated with labor market reforms, that is, the possibility of
conicting e¤ects in the short and the longer run in terms of their impact on either un-
employment or growth specically, cannot be ascertained. Second, almost none of the
existing models considers the supply side of the labor market. In particular, the distri-
bution of the labor force across levels of education, and how it changes over time, are
seldom explicitly analyzed.2 This creates a major di¢ culty in terms of understanding
how the labor market adjusts in response to shocks, how it interacts with the process of
1Some of these contributions also account for the existence of an innovation sector, albeit (as discussed
next) in a partial manner.
2Some models introduce a work-leisure trade-o¤ into workersutility functions (thereby accounting for
the intensive margin of labor supply), but the distribution of the labor force across skills (the extensive
margin) is kept constant. Other contributions do introduce disembodied human capital in the Lucas-
Uzawa tradition, but also fail to account for the heterogeneous distribution of skills in the labor force.
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economic growth, and how public policy can a¤ect unemployment and its composition.
Indeed, accounting for both the demand and supply sides of the labor market is essential
to fully understand these issues. Third, only a few contributions (including again Cac-
ciatore and Fiori (2016)) study the impact of labor market reforms on welfare and the
possibility that growth and welfare e¤ects may move in opposite directions. This may help
to understand (organized) resistance to reform. Moreover, these conicting e¤ects may
also have a temporal dimension, which can be studied only if transitional dynamics are
accounted for. Finally, there have been few attempts to assess quantitatively in terms
of unemployment, growth, or welfare the benets of a simultaneous implementation of
labor market reforms, compared to a piecemeal approach, and the scope for exploiting
policy externalities to mitigate the welfare cost of reforms. This matters because the
impact of a specic policy may depend on whether other policies are implemented at the
same time. Ignoring policy externalities is a potential source of bias.
The purpose of this paper is to address all of these issues, using an overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) endogenous growth model with a heterogeneous labor force, nal good
and innovation sectors, labor market rigidities, and structural unemployment. To model
wage formation in nal good production, where activity involves more routine tasks and
e¤ort is fully observable, trade unions are introduced; but to model wage formation in
the innovation sector, an e¢ ciency wage specication is adopted. This approach, as
argued elsewhere in the literature, is better suited than standard search models of the
Mortensen-Pissarides type to understand the link between wages and productivity in in-
novation activities. Indeed, in these activities, rms cannot monitor researcherse¤ort
perfectly; the key issue for an employer is thus to mitigate incentives to shirk and encour-
age creativity. A natural approach is thus to use an e¢ ciency wage framework, in this
case linking e¤ort and wages. As a result, persistent uncompetitive wage di¤erentials for
highly-skilled workers may emerge across sectors.
While we are able to solve for the balanced growth path, the complexity of our model
precludes a full analytical characterization of its dynamic properties. We therefore cal-
ibrate it and perform an extensive range of quantitative simulations. Importantly, we
calibrate the model for two di¤erent groups of countries which are known for facing a
range of labor market rigidities (including minimum wages and active trade unions) and
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have recorded high structural unemployment rates in recent years: a group of high-income
European countries and a group of middle-income Latin American countries. In contrast
to existing studies, therefore, our experiments allow us to compare systematically the
impact of labor market reforms in two signicantly di¤erent economic environments. We
assess the impact of these experiments not only on unemployment, growth, and welfare,
but also on the misallocation of talent, a situation where individuals with abilities that
are high enough to operate in the innovation sector end up instead performing routine
production tasks.
In addition to evaluating the e¤ects of single policy experiments, we consider composite
programs and examine to what extent policy externalities mitigate the adverse e¤ects of
individual reforms. We also consider the cases where composite reform programs are
combined with skills expansion and research productivity-enhancing policies, as well as
an increase in public investment in infrastructure. Such investments have been advocated
in a number of developed and developing countries in the aftermath of the global nancial
crisis not only as a short-term Keynesian response due to their demand-side e¤ects, but
also as a fundamental step to improve productivity due to their supply-side e¤ects (see
for instance LSE Growth Commission (2013) and International Monetary Fund (2016)).
To preview our results, we nd that labor market reforms entail a two-way causal-
ity between growth and unemployment: growth tends to lower unemployment, through
its impact on labor demand; but unemployment may lower growth because it reduces
(through its wage signalling e¤ects) incentives to acquire skills and constrains the ability
to expand innovation activities a key engine of growth. Individual labor market reforms
may generate a weak correlation between growth and unemployment, as predicted in a
number of existing studies; in addition, they may have conicting e¤ects on growth and
welfare in the long run. To some extent, this trade-o¤ can be mitigated by exploiting pol-
icy externalities. The scope for labor market reforms to promote innovation and growth,
while at the same time improving welfare, reducing unemployment, and tempering the
misallocation of talent, is enhanced when they are accompanied by labor productivity-
enhancing measures, such as increased research monitoring intensity. In middle-income
economies, ambitious reforms aimed at increasing e¢ ciency, both in the public and the
private sectors, are particularly important to secure the benets of labor market reforms.
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In addition, public investment in infrastructure may help to boost employment in
the short run and mitigate the long-term trade-o¤ between growth and welfare e¤ects
associated with labor market reforms. Finally, a comparison of the sum of the long-run
e¤ects in terms of growth, unemployment and welfare of each individual policy in a com-
posite program with those associated with the same composite program suggests that, if
unemployment or social welfare matters more than growth to policymakers, comprehen-
sive reform programs may generate negative externalities. With limited political capital,
overly ambitious labor market reform programs may therefore be costly and ine¤ective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 denes the balanced growth equilibrium and Section 4 characterizes its properties.
Section 5 describes the calibration of the model for typical high- and middle-income
countries with distorted labor markets and high unemployment. Section 6 considers a
variety of individual labor market policies (including a reduction in the minimum wage,
a reduction in unemployment benet rates, and a reduction in the cost of education),
as well as policies aimed at increasing labor productivity in innovation and promoting
human capital accumulation. Section 7 considers composite reform programs involving
a combination of these policies, with and without increases in public investment on in-
frastructure.3 The nal section provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The economy that we consider is populated by individuals with di¤erent innate abilities,
who live for two periods, adulthood and old age. Population is constant at N . Each
individual is endowed with one unit of time in each period of life. In old age, time is
allocated entirely to leisure. There are four production sectors: a manufacturing sector,
which produces a homogeneous nal good with routine tasks, an intermediate goods
sector, an innovation sector, which creates designs used for producing intermediate goods,
and an education sector, which allows individuals to acquire advanced training. The
nal good is produced by combining both private and public inputs, and is used for
consumption, private and public investment, and the production of intermediate goods.
3Appendix C provides a sensivitity analysis with respect to all experiments. The results are quanti-
tatively and qualitatively robust to a signicant range of parameter changes.
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The public input consists of infrastructure and is provided free of charge.4 However, it is
subject to congestion. Production in the innovation sector combines public and private
inputs as well, but workerse¤ort is not observable.
Firms in the nal good and innovation sectors are perfectly competitive whereas those
in the intermediate good sector are monopolistically competitive, producing (as in Romer
(1990)) di¤erentiated varieties of goods. The total number of blueprints existing at a
certain point in time coincides with the number of intermediate input varieties available,
and represents the stock of (nonrival) knowledge.
Two categories of labor are available, untrained (with only basic education) and spe-
cialized (with advanced education).5 Workers are born untrained and must decide at
the beginning of adulthood whether or not to become specialized. Acquiring advanced
education requires both time and pecuniary costs. While all specialized workers can work
in the nal good sector, only those with the highest ability can work in the innovation
sector, as for instance in Böhm et al. (2015). Rigidities prevail in all segments of the
labor market and unemployment emerges in equilibrium.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals have identical preferences but are born with di¤erent abilities, indexed by
a. Ability is instantly observable by all and follows a continuous distribution with den-
sity function f(a) and cumulative distribution function F (a), with support (0; 1). For
tractability, a is assumed to be uniformly distributed on its support. Each individual
maximizes utility and decides whether to engage in market work as an untrained worker
or (after training) as a specialized worker.
Specically, an adult with ability a can enter the labor force at the beginning of period t
as an untrained worker and earn the wage wUt , which is independent of the workers ability.
Alternatively, the individual may choose to rst spend a fraction " 2 (0; 1) of his/her time
4As noted later, the model is parameterized separately for both high-income and middle-income coun-
tries. For the former group, the public input can be viewed as consisting more of advanced infrastructure
(high-speed rail, air-tra¢ c control systems, advanced information and communication technologies in
general, and high-speed communication networks in particular), whereas for the latter it can be viewed
as consisting more of basic infrastructure (namely, roads, electricity, and basic telecommunications). See
Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) for a discussion.
5Formally there are only two periods in the model, but implicitly there is a rst period where basic
education is acquired.
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endowment at the beginning of adulthood in higher education, incur a cost tct > 0, and
then enter the labor force for the remainder of the period as a specialized worker, earning
either the wage wSYt if employed in the nal good sector, or w
SR
t if employed in the
innovation sector. During training, workers earn no income. All individuals can either
be employed (superscript E) or unemployed (superscript L). If employed, an untrained
individual can work only in the nal good sector. All specialized individuals can work in
that sector as well, but only those with the highest level of ability, a > aR, can potentially
work in the innovation sector. The threshold ability level aR is taken to be constant,
consistent with the assumption that, for any given population, the spread of individuals
along the ability continuum is largely determined by nature.6 If unemployed, individuals
earn an unemployment benet, bht , h = U; S, which is not taxable.
Let ch;jtjt+n denote consumption at period t + n of an individual h = U; SY; SR, either
employed or unemployed, j = E;L, born at the beginning of period t, with n = 0; 1. The
individuals discounted utility function is given by
V h;jt = C ln c
h;j
tjt +
ln ch;jtjt+1
1 + 
; h = U; SY; SR; j = E;L (1)
where ; C > 0 are the common discount rate and preference parameter, respectively.
7
The period-specic budget constraints are given by
cU;jtjt + s
Uj
t =

(1  )wUt
bUt
if j = Y
if j = L
; (2)
ch;jtjt + s
h
t =

(1  )[(1  ")wht   tct]
(1  ")bSt   tct
if j = E; h = SY; SR
if j = L
(3)
ch;jtjt+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
h
t ; h = U; SY; SR; j = E;L (4)
where sh;jt is savings, 1 + rt+1 the gross rate of return between periods t and t + 1, and
 2 (0; 1) the tax rate.
An individual nds it optimal to train if and only if his expected earnings as a special-
ized worker, adjusted for the time and pecuniary costs of training, exceeds the expected
6Hypotheses such as the Flynn e¤ect in the psychological science literature do suggest that IQ scores
tend to improve as the share of the skilled population grows (see Flynn (2007)). However, this remains
a contentious subject of research and in the absence of conclusive evidence we treat aR as xed.
7Because leisure does not enter the utility function, the opportunity cost of unemployment is simply
the wage foregone.
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earnings of an untrained worker:
(1  ")(SYt wSYt + SRt wSRt + SLt bSt )  tct  (1  ULt )wUt + ULt bUt ; (5)
where the going wage, or the unemployment benet, is weighted by the respective prob-
ability of being either employed or unemployed, ht 2 (0; 1), for h = SY; SR; SL; UL.8
In specifying (5), we assume for simplicity that an individual knows if his/her ability is
above or below the threshold aC and can therefore decide whether to acquire specialized
skills or not at the beginning of adulthood, but nds out whether his/her ability is at or
above aR > aC only after undergoing training. Put di¤erently, this specication captures
the idea that an individual discovers whether he/she is super smartonly upon college
graduation a sensible assumption in practice.9
The training cost is proportional to the expected specialized wage when employed and
varies inversely with the individuals ability, which determines how fast (or how well) he
or she can learn:
tct = (1  ")(SYt wSYt + SRt wSRt )=a; (6)
with ;  2 (0; 1). The assumption on the productivity parameter  ensures that the
e¤ect of ability on training costs is subject to diminishing returns.
As shown in Appendix A, the threshold level of ability aCt such that all individuals
with ability higher than aCt choose to undergo training is given by
aCt = 
1=

1  (1  
UL
t )w
U
t + 
UL
t b
U
t   (1  ")SLt bSt
(1  ")(SYt wSYt + SRt wSRt )
 1=
: (7)
This equation plays an important role in understanding the dynamics of the labor
market; it shows that labor market outcomes (which are partly inuenced by public
policy) have a direct impact on the decision to acquire training, through their e¤ect on
expected, rather than actual, wages.
The productivity of untrained workers is constant regardless of ability and is normal-
ized to unity. Given (7), the raw supply of untrained labor, NUt , is equal to the number
8Equation (5) is assumed to hold as a strict inequality for the individual with the highest ability, that
is, a = 1, otherwise nobody would choose to become specialized.
9Without this assumption two separate conditions, one for those with a > aR (which would take the
form shown in (5), given that these individuals can work anywhere) and one for those with a < aR (which
would exclude the wage in the innovation sector in calculating the expected specialized wage) would be
required. This would complicate signicantly the analysis, without adding much additional insight.
8
of individuals in the population who choose not to undergo training:
NUt = N
Z aCt
0
f(a)da = aCt N: (8)
The raw supply of specialized workers with ability a 2 (aCt ; aR) is N
R aR
aCt
f(a)da =
(aR aCt ) N . However, the average productivity of these workers equals (aCt +aR)=2; thus,
the e¤ective supply of specialized labor with a 2 (aCt ; aR) can be dened as
(aR   aCt )(aCt + aR)
2
N =
(aR)2   (aCt )2
2
N: (9)
As noted earlier, among specialized workers, only those with ability a 2 (aR; 1) can
operate in the innovation sector; thus, the (e¤ective) supply of labor to that segment of
the market, NRt , is
NRt =
(1  aR)(aR + 1)
2
N =
1  (aR)2
2
N: (10)
Adding (9) and (10), the total (e¤ective) supply of specialized workers, NSt , is
NSt =
1  (aCt )2
2
N: (11)
However, workers with the highest ability are also able to work in the nal good sector,
at the same wage as other specialized workers there. Assuming that all workers with ability
greater than aR seek employment in innovation activities rst, the supply of specialized
labor to manufacturing is not given by NSt  NRt , but rather by NSt  NSRt , where NSRt 
NRt is the actual (demand-determined) level of employment in the innovation sector.
Thus, to the extent that NRt > N
SR
t , there is misallocation of talent, in the sense that
individuals with abilities that are high enough to operate in the innovation sector may
end up performing routine tasks in manufacturing. In our numerical experiments we
measure talent misallocation by the share of overqualied workers in the nal good
sector, dened as max[0; (NRt   NSRt )=NSYt ], where NSYt is actual employment in that
sector.
2.2 Final Good
Final good production by rm i, Y it , requires the use of specialized labor, N
SY
i;t , untrained
labor, NUYi;t , private capital, K
P
i;t, aggregate public capital, K
G
t , and the combination of
intermediate inputs, xi;s;t, with s 2 (0;Mt).
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The production function is specied as
Y it = [
KGt
(KPt )
K N N
]![(1  ")NSYi;t ]
S
(NUYi;t )
U (KPi;t)
[
Z Mt
0
xi;s;tds]
=; (12)
where S; U ; ;  2 (0; 1), ! > 0, K ; N > 0,  = 1   (S + U)   ,  2 (0; 1) and
1=(1 ) > 1 is (the absolute value of) the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate
good, and KPt aggregate private capital. Constant returns therefore prevail with respect
to private inputs, and public capital is subject to congestion, measured by aggregate
private capital and population.
Assuming full depreciation, rm is prots are dened as
Yi;t = Y
i
t  
Z Mt
0
P st xi;s;tds  (1 + & t)[wSYt (1  ")NSYi;t + wUt NUYi;t ]  rtKPi;t;
where & t > 0 is the rms contribution rate to the unemployment insurance scheme, based
on its total wage bill.
Each rm maximizes prots subject to (12) with respect to labor, private capital, and
quantities of intermediate goods xi;s;t, 8s, taking factor prices and Mt as given. This
yields, in standard fashion,
wSYt = (
S
1 + & t
)
Yi;t
(1  ")NSYi;t
; wUt = (
U
1 + & t
)
Yi;t
NUYi;t
; (13)
rt = (
Yi;t
KPi;t
); (14)
xi;s;t = (
Zi;t
P st
)1=(1 ); s = 1; :::Mt; (15)
Zi;t = Yi;t=
Z Mt
0
(xi;s;t)
ds: (16)
2.3 Intermediate Goods
As in Romer (1990), intermediate goods rms produce inputs based on blueprints pro-
duced by the innovation sector. Each rm produces one, and only one, horizontally-
di¤erentiated good, using the same technology used to produce the nal good. Production
of each unit of intermediate goods costs one unit of nal output.
Each producer must purchase a patented design from the innovation sector. Once
the patent fee Qt is paid, each producer sets its price to maximize prots, given the
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perceived demand function for its good (15), which determines marginal revenue. Under
a symmetric equilibrium, prots are given by It = (Pt   1)xt or, using (15) and (16),
It = (Pt   1)[Yt=PtMtxt ]1=(1 ). In standard fashion, the solution yields the optimal
price as
P st =
1

: 8s = 1; :::Mt (17)
Using (15), the quantity demanded at this price is xs;t = (Zt)1=(1 ), 8s, that is,
noting that under symmetry
RMt
0
xs;tds = Mtx

t ,
xt = (
Yt
Mt
); (18)
with maximum prot given by
It = (1  )(
Yt
Mt
): (19)
Intermediate-input producing rms last only one period, and patents are auctioned o¤
randomly to a new group of rms in each period. Thus, each rm holds a patent only for
the period during which it is bought, implying monopoly prots during that period only;
yet patents last forever.10 By arbitrage, therefore,
Qt = 
I
t : (20)
2.4 Innovation Sector
Firms in the innovation sector use only high-ability specialized labor, in quantity (1  
")NSRt . There is no aggregate uncertainty and the production technology is
Mt+1  Mt = ARt [
eRt (1  ")NSRt
N
]; (21)
where eRt is the level of e¤ort and A
R
t productivity, which depends on access to public
infrastructure and, consistent with the standing-on-shoulder e¤ect (see Jones (2005)), the
stock of knowledge:
ARt = (k
G
t )
R1Mt; (22)
with kGt = K
G
t =K
P
t and 
R
1 > 0. Thus, in terms of e¢ ciency units of labor, e¤ort
and workers are perfect substitutes. Because of duplication e¤ects there are diminishing
10This assumption simplies signicantly the analysis; see Agénor and Canuto (2015b) for a discussion.
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marginal returns to labor, so that  2 (0; 1).11 Access to public capital is subject to
(proportional) congestion, measured by private capital. In addition, to eliminate scale
e¤ects, as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) innovation di¢ culty is measured in terms
of population size.
E¤ort is modeled following the simple specication developed in Agénor and Aizenman
(1999). In deciding how much e¤ort to provide at t, researchers evaluate a period utility
function, UR(wSRt ; 1  eRt ), which depends on the wage earned, wSRt , and the disutility of
e¤ort, 1  eRt :
UR(wSRt ; 1  eRt ) = ln[(wSRt )R(1  eRt )1 R ]; (23)
where R 2 (0; 1). Let  denote the probability that a researcher is caught shirking, in
which case he is red and ends up being either employed in manufacturing, at the going
wage wSYt , or unemployed, collecting the benet b
S
t . In line with the standard Shapiro-
Stiglitz shirking model, we assume that it is related one-to-one with the intensity with
which rms in the innovation sector choose to monitor their workers. Thus, although given
at the level of each individual researcher,  (or, equivalently here, monitoring intensity)
is in principle a choice variable at the level of the rm, which would normally vary in-
versely with unit monitoring costs. In turn, these costs may depend on both rm-specic
characteristics (the required number of supervisors for particular tasks, for instance) and
sector- or economy-wide factors. In particular, worker monitoring may be inherently more
di¢ cult in innovation activities, because of imperfect observability of creative e¤ort. For
the moment, we assume that  is constant.
The level of e¤ort provided is either eRt , when employed and not shirking, or the
minimum eRm 2 (0; 1), when shirking while employed. The optimal level of e¤ort is such
that the utility derived from working without shirking (as given by (23)) is at least equal
to the expected utility of shirking:
UR(wSRt ; 1  eRt )   ln[(SYt wSYt + SLt bSt )R(1  eRm)1 R ] (24)
+(1  ) ln[(wSRt )R(1  eRm)1 R ];
where the latter is dened as a weighted average of the expected income earned if caught
shirking and red with probability  (either working at the alternative wage wSYt , with
11See Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a discussion. Empirical estimates of  are discussed later.
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probability SYt , or unemployed, with probability 
SL
t , and earning the benet b
S
t ) and
if not caught with probability 1    (earning the going wage wSRt ). In either case, for
simplicity the worker provides the minimum e¤ort level eRm.
In equilibrium, workers are indi¤erent between shirking and not shirking; condition
(24) therefore holds with equality and can be solved to give
eRt = 1  (1  eRm)(
SYt w
SY
t + 
SL
t b
S
t
wSRt
) ; (25)
with  = R=(1  R). Thus, an increase in the expected wage in the innovation sector
relative to its opportunity cost raises the level of e¤ort. For a given wage ratio, an increase
in the probability of getting caught shirking (a rise in ) raises also the level of e¤ort.12
Using (21), and taking the patent fee and productivity as given, the rms problem is
to maximize prots by setting both wages and employment:
max
NSRt ;w
SR
t
Rt = QtA
R
t [
eRt (1  ")NSRt
N
]   (1 + & t)wSRt (1  ")NSRt ; (26)
subject to (25). The rst-order conditions are given by
(NSRt )
 1(eRt )
(1  ")QtA
R
t
N
= (1 + & t)(1  ")wSRt ; (27)
(eRt )
 1QtA
R
t
N
[(1  ")NSRt ]
 (1  eRt )
wSRt
= (1 + & t)(1  ")NSRt : (28)
These equations can be combined to give
wSRt = 
R(SYt w
SY
t + 
SL
t b
S
t ); (29)
where R = [(1 +  )(1  eRm)]1= > 1.13 Thus, the e¢ ciency wage is proportional to, and
higher than, the (expected) opportunity cost of working in the innovation sector. At the
optimal wage, the equilibrium level of e¤ort is constant at ~eR = 1  (1  eRm)(R)  > 0.
2.5 Government
The government operates both a general budget and an unemployment insurance fund. It
cannot issue bonds and must run balanced accounts in both cases. To nance its general
12If e¤ort is independent of relative wages ( = 0), or if wages are continuously equal in both sectors,
then eRt = e
R
m.
13The Solow condition can be established by combining (27) and (28), which yields wSRt (e
R
t )
0=eRt = 1,
where (eRt )
0 = deRt =dw
SR
t =  (1  eRt )=wSRt .
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outlays, the government levies a tax on wages at the rate  . These outlays consist of
investment in infrastructure, GIt , and spending on other (not directly productive) items,
GOt . It imposes no fees for its services.
The governments general budget is given by
GIt +G
O
t = fwUt NUYt +NSYt [(1  ")wSYt   tct] +NSRt [(1  ")wSRt   tct]g: (30)
Shares of spending are constant fractions of government revenues:
Git = ifwUt NUYt +NSYt [(1  ")wSYt   tct] +NSRt [(1  ")wSRt   tct]g; i = I; O (31)
where i 2 (0; 1). Combining (30) and (31) therefore yields
I + O = 1: (32)
Let ht , h = UY; SY; SR, denote the proportion of employed individuals of category h
in the adult population N , and let ht , h = UL; SL, denote the unemployment rate (again,
in proportion of N) of labor category h; the unemployment insurance funds budget is
given by
(bUt 
UL
t + b
S
t 
SL
t ) N = & tfwUt UYt + (1  ")(wSYt SYt + wSRt SRt )g N;
which implies
& t =
bUt 
UL
t + b
S
t 
SL
t
wUt 
UY
t + (1  ")(wSYt SYt + wSRt SRt )
: (33)
Thus, all else equal, a higher benet rate (bUt or b
S
t ) raises the payroll contribution
rate, thereby reducing labor demand. In turn, the reduction in labor demand (through
a fall in employment ratios) mitigates the initial increase in the contribution rate at the
initial unemployment and wage rates.
Assuming full depreciation, the stock of public capital evolves according to
KGt+1 = 'G
I
t ; (34)
where ' 2 (0; 1) is an e¢ ciency parameter, which measures the extent to which investment
outlays translate into actual public capital (see Agénor (2012)).
To ensure the existence of a nondegenerate solution, the unemployment benet is set
as a linear function of the level of per capita income, so that
bht = 
hYt
N
; (35)
where h 2 (0; 1), with h = U; S, is the benet indexation parameter.
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2.6 The Labor Market
Wages in the nal good sector are set through a right-to-manage bargaining process
between a centralized trade union and rms. The unions objective is to maximize the
expected current income of both types of workers in manufacturing, subject to wage and
employment targets.14
Specically, the union sets wUt and w
SY
t with the objective of maximizing a utility
function that depends on deviations of both employment and wages from their target
levels, subject to the manufacturing sectors demand schedule for each type of labor.
Normalizing the employment target to zero, the unions utility function takes the standard
form
Vht = (w
h
t   whTt )
h
(Nht )
1 h ;
where h = UY; SY , h 2 (0; 1), and Nht is given in (13). The term whTt measures the
unions target wage, whereas h reects the relative importance that the union attaches
to wage deviations from that target. Maximizing this function with respect to wht gives
the actual wage as a mark-up (which is increasing in h) over the target wage:15
wht = (
1  h
1  2h )w
hT
t : (36)
The target wage for untrained workers is related positively to a government-imposed
minimum wage, wUMt , and negatively to the unemployment rate for that category of labor,
ULt :
wUTt = w
UM
t (
UL
t )
 {U ;
where {U > 0. When unemployment is high, the probability of nding a job (at any
given wage) is low. Consequently, the higher the unemployment rate, the greater the
incentive for the union to moderate its wage demands in order to induce rms to increase
employment.
In turn, the minimum wage is linearly related to the level of per capita income:
wUMt = w
U
0 (
Yt
N
); (37)
14The unions optimization problem is static, in the sense that when it formulates its wage demands
it takes the existing capital stock as given and does not internalize the e¤ect of future wages on the
rms decision to accumulate capital and thus future labor demand. This is tantamount to assuming
sequential wage bargaining and the absence of reputational links across periods.
15To ensure that wht > 0 requires 
h < 0:5, a condition that we impose in the calibration.
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where wU0 > 0 is an indexation parameter.
Substituting the above expressions into (36) therefore yields
wUt = w
U
0 (
1  U
1  2U )(
Yt
N
)(ULt )
 {U : (38)
The target wage for specialized workers is negatively related as well to the unemploy-
ment rate for that category of workers, SLt , and linearly related once again to the level
of per capita income, Yt= N , so that wSY Tt = w
SY
0 (
SL
t )
 {SYt= N , where wSY0 > 0 is an
indexation parameter. Inserting this result into (36) yields
wSYt = w
SY
0 (
1  SY
1  2SY )(
SL
t )
 {S(
Yt
N
): (39)
The equilibrium condition of the market for untrained labor is given by
NUt = N
UL
t +N
UY
t ;
where NULt is the number of unemployed. Equivalently, in terms of ratios to population,
Ut = 
UL
t + 
UY
t ; (40)
where Ut = N
U
t =
N , which from (8) is equal to aCt . Thus, the probability of employment
for an untrained individual, UYt , and the probability of an untrained individual becoming
unemployed, ULt , are given respectively by
UYt =
UYt
Ut
; and ULt = 1  UYt =
ULt
Ut
: (41)
The equilibrium condition of the market for (e¤ective) specialized labor is given by:
NSt = N
SY
t +N
SR
t +N
SL
t ;
or equivalently, in terms of ratios to population,
St = 
SY
t + 
SR
t + 
SL
t : (42)
The employment and unemployment probabilities for specialized workers are given by
SYt =
SYt
St
; SRt =
SRt
St
; and SLt = 1  SYt   SRt =
SLt
St
. (43)
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Figure 1 summarizes the production structure and the sectoral distribution of labor.
Although it does not show (for clarity) how employment and unemployment probabilities
are determined, it illustrates fairly well how labor market rigidities a¤ect wage formation
and unemployment, and the feedback e¤ect of unemployment (through its impact on
compensation for the unemployed) on expected wages and the decision to acquire advanced
training.
2.7 Savings-Investment Balance
Given full depreciation, the saving-investment balance requires private capital in t+ 1 to
be equal to savings in period t by all individuals, employed or unemployed, born in t  1:
KPt+1 = (s
UY
t N
UY
t + s
UL
t N
UL
t ) + (s
SY
t N
SY
t + s
SR
t N
SR
t + s
SL
t N
SL
t ): (44)
3 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
In this economy, an equilibrium with imperfect competition and unemployment is a se-
quence of consumption and saving allocations fch;jtjt ; ch;jtjt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h = U; SY; SR,
j = E;L, prices of production inputs fwUt ; wSYt ; wSRt ; rt+1g1t=0, private capital fKPt g1t=0,
public capital fKGt g1t=0, existing varieties fMtg1t=0, prices and quantities of intermediate
inputs fP st ; xs;tg1t=0, 8s 2 (0;Mt), such that, given initial stocks KP0 ; KG0 ;M0 > 0,
a) all individuals, specialized or untrained, employed or unemployed, maximize utility
by choosing consumption subject to their intertemporal budget constraint, taking factor
prices, the tax rate, and the unemployment benet as given;
b) rms in the nal good sector maximize prots by choosing labor, private capital,
and intermediate inputs, taking factor prices as given;
c) intermediate input producers set prices so as to maximize prots, while internalizing
the e¤ect of their decisions on the perceived aggregate demand curve for their product;
d) producers in the innovation sector maximize prots by choosing labor and wages,
taking patent prices and productivity as given;
e) the price of each blueprint extracts all prots made by the corresponding interme-
diate input producer;
f ) the trade union in the manufacturing sector sets wages so as to maximize its utility,
subject to the demand for labor by rms in the nal good sector;
g) the nal good market clears; and
h) unemployment of both categories of workers prevails.
A balanced growth equilibrium is an equilibrium with imperfect competition and un-
employment in which
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a) fch;jtjt ; ch;jtjt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h = U; SY; SR, j = E;L, and KPt , KGt , Yt, Mt, wUt , wSYt ,
wSRt , b
h
t , h = U; S, grow at the constant, endogenous rate 1 + , implying that the
knowledge-private capital ratio and the public-private capital ratio are constant;
b) the rate of return on capital, 1 + rt+1, is constant;
c) the price of intermediate goods, Pt, and the patent price, Qt, are constant;
e) the threshold level of individuals who choose to remain untrained, aCt , is constant;
f ) the fractions of the specialized and untrained labor force employed in manufacturing,
UYt and 
SY
t , and the fraction of specialized workers employed in the innovation sector,
SRt , are constant;
g) specialized and untrained unemployment rates, ULt and 
SL
t , are constant; and
h) employment and unemployment probabilities, UYt , 
SY
t , 
SR
t , and 
UL
t , 
SL
t are
constant.
4 Properties of the Equilibrium
A complete analytical solution of the model is provided in Appendix A. A key step in
deriving the equilibrium growth rate is to establish the restrictions needed on the con-
gestion parameters in (12). With mt = Mt=KPt denoting the knowledge-private capital
ratio, equation (12) yields
Yt = (1  ")S(SYt )
S
(UYt )
UN
S+U !N
t (45)
(kGt )!

1m
(1 )=
t (
Yt
KPt
)

(KPt )
+=+!(1 K);
where 1 = . To ensure that production is linear in the private capital stock, K and
N must satisfy the conditions 
S + U   !N = 0 and  + = + !(1   K) = 1. As a
result, the level of output becomes:
Yt =
(kGt )
!=(1 )2
[(SYt )
S(UYt )
U ] 1=(1 )

mt
(1 )=	=(1 )KPt ; (46)
where 2 = (1  ")S=(1 )1 .
In Appendix A we also show that the model can be condensed in the form of a system
consisting of two rst-order dynamic equations in terms of the knowledge-private capital
ratio, mt, and the public-private capital ratio, kGt , as well as 9 core static equations, in
terms of the output-private capital ratio, Yt=KPt , the patent price, Qt, the threshold level
of ability (or equivalently the share of untrained workers), aCt , the shares of specialized
workers in nal good production and innovation activities, SYt and 
SR
t , the share of
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untrained workers in nal good production, UYt , the shares of specialized and untrained
workers in unemployment, SLt and 
UL
t , and the payroll contribution rate, & t . The steady-
state growth rate, 1 + , is shown to be given by16
1 +  = (eR)(1  ")(kG)R1 (SR): (47)
Stability of the economy cannot be studied analytically, given the complexity of the
system. However, it is established numerically (using the calibration discussed next) by
solving the model for a large number of periods and ensuring that the solution values
satisfy the properties of the balanced growth equilibrium dened earlier.
5 Calibration
To study the impact of labor market reforms we calibrate two versions of the model,
the rst corresponding to a typical high-income economy, based on averages for ve
European economies (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and the second to a
typicalmiddle-income economy, based on averages for ve upper-income Latin Ameri-
can economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru). These two versions allow
us to explore the extent to which the e¤ects of labor market reforms depend on struc-
tural characteristics. Indeed, beyond the level of income, the countries included in each
group share a number of common economic features; in particular, all the Latin Ameri-
can countries have a relatively small innovation sector (both in terms of employment and
capacity to create knowledge), whereas all the European countries impose high income
tax and payroll contribution rates to nance large redistribution programs. At the same
time, countries in both groups are characterized by signicant labor market rigidities and
high levels of unemployment, caused largely by permanent, structural factors rather than
cyclical determinants. The main sources of data are the OECD for European economies
and the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Labour O¢ ce (ILO), and
the World Bank for Latin American countries. For convenience, population is normalized
to unity in both cases.
Consider rst the high-income economy. On the household side, the annual discount
rate is set at 0:04. Assuming that there is an implicit rst period (childhood-early adult-
16From the equations in Appendix A, and given that all stock variables grow at the same rate in
equilibrium, other equivalent forms for the steady-state growth rate can of course be dened.
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hood) that is not accounted for, each period in the model is set to 25 years to match
life expectancy data. This gives an intergenerational discount rate of 0:375; the same
value is used for the middle-income economy. The household savings rate, , is set at
0:1094, based on the average (net) household savings rate estimated using OECD data
for 2006-13. The relative cost of specialized training (or tertiary education), , and the
average time spent in such training, ", are calibrated using data from OECD Education
at a Glance 2015. Specically, for the ve countries considered, the expected number of
years of full time schooling in tertiary education is 2:86 years. Divided by 25, this gives
" = 0:115. Regarding education expenditure, we use the estimated annual average tuition
fees charged by educational institutions in 2013-14. While the OECD publishes a range of
values for each country and across public and independent private institutions, we narrow
them down to a single range estimate for each country. Then, dividing by the reported
average annual wage, the average tuition fee is calculated to be about 6:1-7:7 percent of
the average wage. We set  to a slightly higher value of 0:08 to account for other ancillary
expenditure. To account for a high degree of e¢ ciency of training in a developed-economy
setting, the parameter  is set at a high value of 0:9.
In the nal good sector, the elasticity of production with respect to the public-private
capital ratio, !, is set at 0:17, in line with the meta-analysis of Bom and Ligthart (2014)
and the results of Calderón et al. (2015). The elasticities of output with respect to
private capital and labor are set at standard values of  = 0:3 and 0:6, respectively,
consistent with the evidence (see for instance Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009) and Varga
et al. (2014)). We then set S = U = 0:3, to reect equal importance of both types of
labor in production. Given the assumption of constant returns to scale, the elasticity of
output with respect to intermediate inputs, , is set at 0:1.
In the intermediate good sector, the substitution parameter, , is set at 0:61, consis-
tent with the value used by Iacopetta (2011) for instance. This yields an elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods of 2:6, which corresponds to the value estimated
by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
In the innovation sector, the productivity parameter with respect to public infrastruc-
ture, R1 , is set at 0:186, based on the estimates of Agénor and Neanidis (2015). The
elasticity of design production with respect to labor, , is set at 0:6, the same value used
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by Varga et al. (2014) for Italy and Spain. It is also within the range of 0:13-0:74 es-
timated by Pessoa (2005) for OECD countries. The elasticity of e¤ort with respect to
relative wages,  , is set at 0:7, slightly higher than the value used by Wauthy and Zenou
(1997). To capture the idea that researchers in innovation value wages more than leisure,
we set R = 0:9 for the elasticity parameter in the second-stage utility function. This
yields a probability of getting caught shirking of  = 0:078. With a minimum research
e¤ort of eRm = 0:1, this yields a value of 1:46 for the composite parameter 
R; consequently
equilibrium e¤ort is eR = 0:31.
For the government, the e¤ective tax rate on wages,  , is calculated in two steps,
based on OECD tax statistics. First, taxes on household factor income are estimated by
calculating total tax revenues net of taxes on property, goods and services, and social
security contributions. As a share of GDP, this gives an average of 11:9 percent for the
period 2006-13.17 Second, this number is divided by the total labor share S + U = 0:6
to give  = 0:198. To calculate the initial share of public investment on infrastructure
in total (noninterest) spending, I , we also proceed in two steps. First, using combined
OECD data on non-ICT infrastructure investment and ICT investment for the years 2006-
13, the average percentage of (total) infrastructure investment to GDP across the sample
economies is estimated at 0:0106. Second, this estimate is divided by the average share
of noninterest expenditure in GDP for the same period, as estimated from OECD data,
which is 0:4972. This yields I = 0:021, or equivalently 1:1 percent of GDP. Lastly, the
e¢ ciency parameter of government investment, ', is calibrated using the wastefulness
of government spendingindicator in the Global Competitiveness Report index compiled
by the World Economic Forum, which is consistent with the methodology used by the
European Commission. This yields ' = 0:5. This value is rather on the low side for a
high-income economy but is consistent with the informal evidence on comparative public
sector e¢ ciency in Afonso et al. (2003) for instance, who identied Italy, Portugal, and
Spain as among the most ine¢ cient among the 23 developed economies in their sample.
In the labor market the benet indexation parameters, U and S, are both set equal
to 0:4, in line with values used in models with unemployment insurance, such as Heer and
Morgenstern (2005). Given (35), this means that the initial values of bS and bU are the
17Given the OECDs revenue classication system, this is equivalent to calculating taxes on household
income by adding up income taxes and taxes on workforce and payroll.
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same. For the union bargaining parameters, U and SY , we start with the estimates of
Blanchower and Bryson (2002), which give an average union wage mark-up of 1:069.18
Using this value, estimates for U and SY can be derived by solving (36) backward;
this gives U = SY = 0:06. In terms of the elasticity of the unions target wage with
respect to unemployment, {h, h = U; S, Montuenga et al. (2003) estimate the wage
elasticity with respect to the unemployment rate for four of the European economies in
our sample (with the exception of Belgium); this yields an average value of  0:12. In
the absence of skills-specic estimates, we set {U = {S = 0:12. The shift parameter
wU0 is solved implicitly from the minimum wage equation (37), based on OECD data on
monthly minimum wages relative to monthly average earnings (as a proxy for monthly
income per capita); this gives 0:522. The shift parameter wSY0 in (39) is solved for in the
same manner, using data on monthly earnings for skilled workers, after accounting for the
average gap in earnings dispersion provided in the OECDs Employment Database. This
gives wSY0 = 0:74.
These values are all summarized in Table 1. Initial steady-state values are shown in
Table 2 and are calibrated as follows.
The share of untrained workers in the adult population, U , is set equal to 0:732,
which is calculated by subtracting the average share of workers with tertiary education
(obtained from OECD data) from unity. Hence, S = 0:232. The share of e¤ective spe-
cialized workers in the innovation sector, SR, is set equal to 0:0194, based on the OECDs
consolidated data on (private and government) researchers. The share of unemployed spe-
cialized workers in the population, SL, is set at 0:068, which corresponds to the value
provided by the OECDs World Indicators of Skills for Employment data for skilled un-
employment over the period 2006-13. By implication the share of e¤ective specialized
workers in the nal good sector, SY , is equal to 0:145. Based on the same OECD data,
the untrained unemployment rate, UL, is set equal at 0:126, corresponding to the aver-
age, group-specic unskilled unemployment rate. By implication, the share of untrained
workers in the nal good sector, UY , is 0:606. The probabilities in (41) and (43) are then
easily calculated and are also reported in Table 2. The aggregate unemployment rate can
also be easily derived, given relative shares of untrained and specialized workers in the
18For France, the more recent results of Breda (2015) corroborate the Blanchower-Bryson estimate.
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work force; this gives 0:1058. To estimate the misallocation of talent, we use the average
value over 2006-13 from OECD data on the proportion of workers who are overqualied,
which is equal to 0:189.19 Based on that value, the potential supply of specialized labor
to that segment of the market, R, can be estimated backward using the denition of
the share of overqualiedworkers in the nal good sector, (R   SR)=SY . Given that
SRt = 0:0194 and 
SY
t = 0:145, this yields 
R = 0:189  0:145 + 0:0194 = 0:0467. By
implication, the threshold value of ability to work in the innovation sector is solved from
(10) to give aR = 0:952. For the rmspayroll contribution rate, &, the average employers
contribution rate of the ve economies obtained from the OECD Social Security Dataset
is used; this gives & = 0:126. Using the OECDs relative earnings data by education gap
for 2012 (low and medium-skilled workers on the one hand, and high-skilled workers on
the other), the untrained-specialized wage ratio is calibrated at 0:55; the inverse of this
ratio gives a wage premium of 1:818. The public-private capital ratio, kG, is set based on
Kamps(2006) estimates of public and private capital stocks, yielding kG = 0:189. Using
OECD data, the average nal output-private capital ratio is calculated as Y=KP = 0:286.
An initial estimate of the knowledge-private capital ratio, m, is di¢ cult to construct,
given that the two variables are in principle measured in di¤erent units (the number of
patents for instance for the stock of knowledge, and cumulated real investment spend-
ing, through an e¢ ciency-adjusted, perpetual inventory method, for the capital stock).
Given that this initial ratio is immaterial to the results, we normalize it to 0:1 largely
for computational convenience. The growth rates of nal output and physical capital in
the initial steady state are 0:8 percent on an annual basis, based on the GDP-weighted
average growth rates of the ve economies during 2006-13.
Consider now the typical middle-income country. To capture some relevant stylized
facts for these economies, its baseline calibration needs some distinctive structural char-
acteristics. Given the issues at stake, we highlight the following features. First, it is more
costly, and less e¢ cient, for a worker to train and become specialized. Second, due to
relative scarcity, the elasticity of nal good production with respect to specialized workers
is higher, and there is less substitutability among intermediate goods. Third, the share of
19The data is based on OECD calculations using the EU Labour Force Survey. Based on OECD
denition, the published gures reect the proportion of workers whose educational attainment level is
higher than the level required in their job (as measured based on the modal education level for all workers
in the same occupation).
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public spending on infrastructure is higher but investment (as a result of poor governance)
is less e¢ cient. At the same time, the elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to
public capital is higher, to reect stronger marginal benets due to a lower initial stock
of infrastructure assets. Fourth, the innovation sector (as measured by the number of
researchers) is smaller and workers are subject to less intense monitoring. Quantitatively,
the di¤erences that these features lead to, as well as other di¤erences in terms of initial
values (as discussed next), are shown in Tables 1 and 2 as well.
On the household side, estimates based on household surveys by Gandelman (2015)
are used to set the savings rate  at 0:138. The average school life expectancy at tertiary
level for the ve Latin American economies is 3:07 years, which gives " = 0:123. To
account for more costly and less e¢ cient training, and in the absence of data similar to
those referred to earlier for the high-income economy, the training cost  is set at 0:12,
and the e¢ ciency of training  at 0:5. In the nal good sector, the elasticity of production
with respect to the public-private capital ratio ! is set at 0:24, in line with the general
equilibrium estimates of Agénor and Neanidis (2015). The elasticity parameter with
respect to private capital, , is set equal to 0:35. This is the average value for the ve
Latin American economies used for instance in the growth accounting exercises of Loayza
et al. (2005). Following Agénor and Alpaslan (2014), we set U = 0:20 and S = 0:35, so
that  = 0:1 again. The implied private capital/labor share, 0:35=0:55, is consistent with
a 0:4=0:6 ratio used in some models without intermediate goods.20
In the intermediate good sector, the substitution parameter, , is set at 0:25, which
corresponds to the value used by Agénor and Neanidis (2015) to examine innovation-driven
growth in a developing-economy context. This value implies therefore a lower elasticity of
substitution (about 1:33) between intermediate goods than before. In the same vein, in
the innovation sector R1 is set at 0:3, which is consistent with the initial calibration and
the higher range of estimates obtained by Agénor and Neanidis (2015). To capture lower
research monitoring intensity, the probability of being caught shirking is set 3 percentage
points lower than in the high-income economy, so that  = 0:048. This yields  = 0:43
and an equilibrium e¤ort level of eR = 0:143, which is about half the value calibrated for
the high-income economy.
20See Agénor and Canuto (2015a) for Brazil, and Ferreira et al. (2013) for Latin America.
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For the government, a similar calibration strategy based on the same sources (OECD
tax revenue statistics for Latin America, and Global Competitiveness Index) is used to
estimate the e¤ective tax rate,  , and the e¢ ciency of public investment, '. These
calculations give averages of  = 0:123 and ' = 0:4. This estimate of ' is close to the
median value obtained by Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) in their study of the e¢ ciency of
public investment in developing countries. The share of public spending on infrastructure,
I , is estimated in two steps, based on the data on total infrastructure investment as a
proportion of GDP compiled by Calderon and Servén (2010) and Carranza et al. (2014).
The private component of total investment, obtained from the World Banks Private
Participation in Infrastructure Database, is rst subtracted to obtain the share of public
infrastructure investment as a proportion of GDP. This gure is then multiplied by the
inverse of the ratio of non-interest government expenditure to GDP to obtain an estimate
of I for each of the ve Latin American economies. The average value for the ve
economies for the period 2006-13 gives I = 0:069, or equivalently 2:0 percent of GDP.
Regarding the labor market, in the absence of reliable estimates, the same values of {U
and {S as given earlier are used. The minimum wage shift parameter, wU0 , is again
calibrated based on the average ratio of the gross monthly minimum wage over gross
monthly earnings, as provided in ILO Statistics. This gives wU0 = 0:546. For w
SY
0 ,
the median wage di¤erentials between secondary-primary and secondary-tertiary are used
(see Inter-American Development Bank (2004, Table 1.8)) to estimate an average value for
wage dispersion in the ve Latin American economies. This yields 0:153, which implies,
solving again (39) implicitly, wSY0 = 0:699. This also means that the initial wage gap
for workers in the nal good sector is smaller in the high-income economy. In terms
of unemployment benets (which cover in reality a fairly limited number of workers),
estimates by Cortazar (2001) and Ferrer and Riddell (2009) suggest that for the group of
countries under consideration unemployment insurance represents from 0:12 to 2:5 times
the minimum wage. Multiplying by wU0 = 0:546 yields a range of 0:06-0:82 for 
U and
S. Mid-range values of U = S = 0:4 are used initially. Lastly, for the union wage
mark-up, the Inter-American Development Bank (2004) documents that unions in South
America increase their membersearnings by anywhere between 5 and 10 percent. Setting
the wage mark-up to 1:1, and again solving (36) backward yields U = SY = 0:08.
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In terms of initial steady-state values, the labor shares are estimated using data from
ILO and the World Bank. The share of untrained workers in the population, U , is
set equal to 0:795, which yields S = 0:184. The share of e¤ective specialized workers
in innovation, SR, is estimated by dividing the average number of researchers over the
total workforce for the ve economies over 2006-13, yielding SR = 0:004. The share
of unemployed specialized workers, SL, is set equal to 0:071, based on ILO data. By
implication, SY = 0:109. The unemployment rate for untrained workers, UL, is also
obtained from ILO data and is set at 0:087. These data therefore imply that UY = 0:708,
and the aggregate unemployment rate is now 0:0791. In the absence of OECD-type
data on the proportion of overqualiedworkers in Latin America, we set the ability
threshold aR (and therefore R, as implied by (10)) at the same value as in the high-income
economy, 0:952. The initial degree of talent misallocation can thus be solved backward
from (R   SR)=SY , to give 0:392. This implies that there are a lot more overqualied
workers in the nal good sector of the middle-income economy, consistent with recent
theories of middle-income traps (see Agénor (2016)). The rmspayroll contribution rate,
&, is set at 0:052.21 The initial relative wage ratio is estimated at 0:75 based on ILO data,
implying that the initial expected wage premium is now lower, at 1:333. The public-private
capital ratio calculated for Brazil by Agénor and Canuto (2015a), kG = 0:147, is used as
a proxy for the group average. The nal output-private capital ratio, Y=KP , is calibrated
using the private capital-GDP ratios for Argentina, Brazil and Chile estimated by Tafunell
and Ducoing (2016). This yields Y=KP = 0:429. The knowledge-private capital ratio, m,
is again normalized to 0:1. Lastly, the annual growth rates for nal output and capital
in the initial steady state are equal to 3:9 percent, based on the GDP-weighted average
growth rate of the ve economies during 2006-13.
Based on Tables 1 and 2, and consistent with our earlier discussion, the key di¤erences
between the middle-income economy and the high-income economy can be summarized as
follows: a) higher e¢ ciency and lower cost of training in the high-income economy; b) a
lower degree of substitution between intermediate goods in the middle-income economy;
c) higher elasticities of nal output and innovation activity with respect to public capital
21While payroll taxes represent on average of 31 percent of wages in Latin America (see Lora and
Fajardo (2012)), only the portion that employers contribute to the unemployment/severance fund is
accounted for here.
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in the middle-income economy; d) a higher share of specialized workers in the population
and in the innovation sector in the high-income economy; e) a higher open unemployment
rate for untrained (specialized) workers in the high- (middle-) income economy; f ) a
higher degree of misallocation of talent in the middle-income economy; g) a higher payroll
contribution rate in the high-income economy; and h) higher public-private capital and
nal output-private capital ratios in the high-income economy.22
6 Policy Experiments
We now consider a series of individual labor market policies a reduction in the minimum
wage, a cut in unemployment benet rates, and a reduction in the unions wage mark-
up. In addition, we also consider a policy aimed at increasing labor productivity in
the innovation sector (a subsidy aimed at inducing rms to increase research monitoring
intensity), and a policy aimed at promoting the accumulation of human capital (a cut
in training cost). These policies have been discussed extensively in recent years, in both
developed and developing countries.23 All shocks are permanent and their impact is
measured in terms of a few key variables the supply of untrained workers, the e¤ective
supply of specialized workers (both total and in the innovation sector), the expected wage
premium (which determines training decisions), unemployment rates (total and for both
categories of workers), the payroll contribution rate, and the growth rate of nal output.
To measure the e¢ ciency gains of reforms in terms of factor allocation, the index
of misallocation of talent dened earlier is used. To measure welfare, discounted utility
across an innite sequence of generations is used (see De la Croix and Michel, 2002, p.
91):
Wt = 0:2
1X
h=0
h(V U;Et+s + V
U;L
t+h + V
SY;E
t+h + V
SR;E
t+h + V
S;L
t+h ); (48)
22Another important structural di¤erence between the two types of economies is the share of spending
on R&D: Latin American countries spend much less than European countries in that area (see Inter-
American Development Bank (2014)). Given the focus of this paper we did not explicitly account for
that component of public spending or other measures aimed at stimulating R&D (such as tax credits
or matching grants subsidies). Note also that, consistent with the evidence, for the middle-income
country innovation is perhaps best understood as imitation (adaptation of imported technologies) with
the patent price being akin to a a license fee paid by intermediate goods producers.
23See Inter-American Development Bank (2004), World Bank (2012a, 2012b), Adascalitei and Pignatti
Morano (2015) and International Monetary Fund (2016) for instance.
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where  2 (0; 1) is the social discount factor and V h;jt is the indirect utility function
for agent j; h at t, where h = U; SY; SR and j = E;L. Thus, the utility of agents
in each generation in all ve states in the labor market untrained workers employed
or unemployed, specialized workers employed in the nal good sector and innovation
activities or unemployed are equally weighted.24 For tractability, we restrict our analysis
to the balanced growth path; Appendix B provides an approximation to (48) along that
path, with  set to the same value used for households.
Simulation results (impact and steady-state e¤ects) are summarized in Table 3 for the
high-income economy and in Table 4 for the middle-income economy, whereas Figure 2
shows the steady-state e¤ects for all experiments.25 As noted earlier, a period corresponds
in principle to a generation in our OLG structure. This is reected, in particular, in
the calibration of the discount factor, household time allocation, and the assumption of
full depreciation of physical capital. However, all of the other parameters and variables
(including the growth rate of output) either do not have a time dimension or are calibrated
on the basis of average annual data; thus, for the numerical experiments, the intended
length of a unit of time is best understood as one year.
6.1 Reduction in Minimum Wage
Consider a reduction in the minimum wage, measured by a 5 percent drop in the shift
parameter wU0 . The reduction in the cost of untrained labor increases demand not only
for that category of workers but also (due to gross complementarity) for specialized labor
in manufacturing. At the initial level of wages, the unemployment rate falls and the
employment probability rises for both categories of workers. However, the expected wage
for specialized workers increases by more than the expected wage for untrained workers,
thereby creating incentives to invest in advanced training. The proportion of untrained
(specialized) workers therefore falls (increases) on impact. The increase in specialized
employment occurs in both the nal good and innovation sectors, though in the middle-
income economy, not all specialized labor from the expansion are absorbed, resulting
24Alternatively, time-varying weights, based on period-specic relative shares of each group of workers
in the labor force, could be used. However, this implies that groups are not treated equally (because of
labor reallocation e¤ects) and could impart signicant bias to the results.
25Graphical illustrations of the transitional dynamics for the individual policy experiments are provided
in Appendix C.
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in a slight increase in long-run specialized unemployment rate. The long-run drop in
unemployment is particularly large for untrained workers, of the order of 2:8 percentage
points for the high-income economy and 2:0 percent for the middle-income economy.
Higher employment for both types of workers translate into a reduction in the pay-
roll contribution rate, which magnies the expansion in labor demand in manufacturing.
Although the initial fall in unemployment tends to raise the unions target wages in the
manufacturing sector thereby mitigating the initial e¤ect of a lower minimum wage
the increased demand for both types of workers tends to promote activity and economic
growth, both on impact and in the long run. However, the long-run e¤ects are fairly small
in both economies.
Higher wages for specialized workers in manufacturing imply higher wages in the in-
novation sector as well, to maintain e¤ort there. This helps to increase the share of that
type of labor engaged in innovation activity, thereby mitigating the misallocation of tal-
ent, by a magnitude of 0:9 and 0:4 percentage points in the long-run for the high- and
middle-income economy, respectively. In addition, welfare improves moderately in both
cases. In terms of their magnitude, both results reect a small increase in employment in
the innovation sector, a weak e¤ect on the expansion of varieties of intermediate goods,
and therefore a small impact on growth in the long run. Overall, lower minimum wages
do not necessarily harm growth and welfare in contrast to the predictions of some small
analytical models, such as Cahuc and Michel (1996) but their e¤ects on these variables,
given our calibration, are not quantitatively large.
6.2 Reduction in Unemployment Benet Rates
We consider three separate experiments with respect to a scaling down in unemployment
benet indexation: a) a reduction in the indexation parameter for only untrained workers,
b) a reduction for only specialized workers, and c) a reduction for both type of workers.
Specically, we consider cuts in U and S by 10 percent (from 0:40 to 0:36) each, and
a joint reduction in U and S of the same magnitude. These experiments allow us to
examine and compare the e¤ects of asymmetric adjustments in unemployment insurance
schemes, as well as the case of an across-the-board reform.
A reduction in the benet rate for untrained workers lowers their expected wage at the
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initial level of employment. It therefore raises the education premium and incentives to
undergo training. As a result, the share of untrained (specialized) workers falls (increases).
The opposite occurs for a reduction in the benet rate for specialized workers. However,
in both cases aggregate unemployment falls more so for the high-income economy both
on impact and in the long run. This stems from the fact that the direct e¤ect of a lower
wage is (as a result of gross complementarity) to stimulate the demand for both types
of labor. This e¤ect, which is magnied by a reduction in the payroll contribution rate
needed to ensure that the unemployment funds budget is balanced, persists over time
as well. However, unlike the more e¢ cient high-income economy, for the middle-income
economy long run specialized (untrained) unemployment rate increases slightly when the
indexation parameter is reduced for the untrained (specialized) workers. This is due to
a weaker gross complementarity e¤ect and a smaller expansion in the innovation sector,
which mitigates its capacity to absorb the increase in specialized labor.
On impact, the growth rate of nal output falls in both types of economies. The
reason is that the drop in benets for the unemployed has an adverse e¤ect on savings,
which reduces investment and capital accumulation in the short run. Over time, however,
two o¤setting general equilibrium e¤ects kick in: lower benets (for untrained workers)
improve incentives for individuals to acquire training, whereas a lower contribution rate
raises labor demand. In the long run the net e¤ect of the policy is in fact positive albeit
fairly weak for both economies. Although talent misallocation is mitigated, welfare falls in
both cases (for either shock) essentially because the unemployed are worse o¤. The joint
reduction in unemployment benet indexation gives results that are qualitatively similar
to those obtained in the individual experiments, and in this instance, unemployment
falls both at the aggregate level and its components for both types of economies.
The conicting e¤ect on long-run growth and welfare has not been documented in
previous contributions. It suggests that a reduction in unemployment benet indexation,
while e¤ective in terms of reducing unemployment for both types of labor, may need to
be accompanied by other measures aimed at mitigating their potential adverse impact on
household well-being.
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6.3 Reduction in the Unions Wage Mark-Up
Consider a large reduction in the mark-up over the target wage for both untrained and
specialized workers, as measured by the parameters U and SY , respectively (see (36)).
This experiment involves a uniform 37:5 percent cut in these parameters, from 0:06 to
0:0375 for the high-income economy and from 0:08 to 0:05 for the middle-income economy.
By implication, the union wage mark-up over the target wage (for both untrained and
specialized workers) drops by 2:6 percent in the former and by 3:6 percent in the latter.
In both cases unemployment rates for the two types of workers are lower in the short
run. However, similar to the previous experiments, for the middle-income economy this
labor market policy targeted at untrained (specialized) workers is again ine¤ective in
reducing unemployment of specialized (untrained) workers due to a weaker gross com-
plementarity between the two types of labor. In both economies, the benets in terms
of short-term growth are substantially higher for the mark-up reduction for specialized
workers, but in the long run the unemployment and growth e¤ects (although qualitatively
similar to the short-run e¤ects) are fairly small. For both types of economies, welfare dete-
riorates when the mark-up for specialized workers is reduced, but improves slightly when
the mark-up for untrained workers is lowered. Again, these results suggest that, taken in
isolation, these policies do not have substantial e¤ects on growth and unemployment in
the long run, and maybe detrimental to welfare.
6.4 Increase in Labor Productivity in Innovation
Consider a policy aimed at boosting labor productivity in the innovation sector. We
assume that this policy takes the form of an across-the-board public subsidy to rms in
that sector, which leads directly to a reduction in unit monitoring costs and an increase
in monitoring intensity through improved use of performance indicators and evaluation
scorecards, more frequent peer reviews and performance audits, and so on, in line with
the new thinking on performance management systems. In turn, higher monitoring
intensity, given the one-to-one relationship alluded to earlier, translates into a higher
probability of a research worker getting caught shirking.26 Moreover, we assume that
26See Buckingham and Goodall (2015) for a discussion of current approaches to performance manage-
ment. A more rigorous analysis of the link between public subsidies and rm-level monitoring would
obviously need to provide more explicit microfoundations of the rms decision to monitor, in a setting
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these subsidies are nanced by a reallocation of spending within other government outlays,
GOt . Thus, the policy has no direct scal implications and can be studied independently
from changes in public expenditure. In the high-income case, we assume that this leads
to an increase in  from 0:078 to 0:10, whereas for the middle-income economy, the same
percentage change leads to an increase in  from 0:048 to 0:061. Thus, although the
increase in  is fairly large in relative terms, the new absolute values of the detection
probability remain quite small in both cases.
At the initial level of e¤ort, a higher detection probability allows rms to lower the
e¢ ciency wage paid to researchers. This reects the well-known trade-o¤ between mon-
itoring and wages, when both are choice variables for the rm, as alternative ways to
elicit e¤ort (see for instance, van Schaik and de Groot (2000)). By implication, and given
the downward-sloping labor demand curve for specialized research workers, labor demand
rises in the innovation sector. This mitigates the misallocation of talent and generates
major benets for the economy at large higher e¤ective labor in research activities in-
creases the production of ideas and, consequently, the level of nal output, which sets in
motion a cycle of higher savings, investment, and growth. The economic expansion tends
to reduce the unemployment rates for both types of workers.
From (39), the initial reduction in the specialized unemployment rate and the higher
level of activity in the nal good sector put upward pressure on specialized wages in man-
ufacturing. Similarly, from (35), higher income per capita also leads to an increase in
unemployment benets for both categories of workers. From the wage-setting condition
(29), the specialized wage for research workers must increase as well. The net, initial e¤ect
of these changes on the expected wage premium is positive for both types of economies.
This, in turn, induces more individuals to engage in training. In the long run, the reduc-
tion in the specialized unemployment rate is mitigated due to the increase in labor supply,
but the economy expands by 1:3 percentage points for the high-income economy and by
0:3 percentage points for the middle-income economy. Social welfare also improves.
While these e¤ects are qualitatively the same for both types of economies, they are
generally weaker for the middle-income economy. In particular, the weak e¤ect on growth
wherre monitoring costs are not only specic to the rm but also related through an externality to sector-
wide factors which are given at the level of the rm but may be inuenced by public policy. For our
purpose, however, this reduced-form speciciation is su¢ cient to illustrate the e¤ects at play.
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in the latter case is due to the fact that, in the long run, the expected wage premium
actually falls, thereby mitigating incentives to acquire skills. In addition, the increase in
the e¤ective supply of specialized workers in the innovation sector is fairly small; in turn,
this is because there is a substantial initial gap between the two types of economies in
terms of the probability of research workers getting caught when shirking, as discussed
earlier. Nevertheless, and in contrast to some of the pure labor market policies considered
earlier, this policy is one of the most e¤ective in terms of promoting growth, employment,
and welfare, with no direct conict in the long-run between these objectives.
6.5 Reduction in Training Cost
Finally, consider a policy designed to reduce across the board the cost of specialized
training for individuals, paid for by a reallocation of outlays within the unproductive
component of public spending. The policy once again has no direct scal e¤ects and
is measured by a reduction in  by 5 percent, from 0:080 to 0:076 for the high-income
economy and from 0:120 to 0:114 for the middle-income economy. The size of this shock
is su¢ cient to illustrate the issues at stake.
A reduction in training costs generates a large increase in the supply of specialized
workers (by 1:6 and 3:3 percentage points in the long run, respectively, for the high- and
middle-income economies), a fraction of which being absorbed in the innovation sector.
This increase in supply occurs despite the mitigating e¤ect on wages for that category of
workers and a drop in the expected wage premium. The reduction in the share of untrained
workers has a sizable e¤ect on their unemployment rate; however, the large increase in
the supply of specialized workers leads over time to a higher unemployment rate for
them (by 1:0 and 2:7 percentage points in the long run for the high- and middle-income
economies, respectively). The thrust of these results is that, in both types of economies,
promoting human capital accumulation without adequate measures aimed at encouraging
simultaneously a sustained expansion in labor demand may create an absorption problem
or oversupply of specialized labor in the long run.
In addition, the e¤ect on the rate of economic growth is small on impact in both
types of economies and, in the case of the middle-income economy, growth is weaker in
the long run. The reason, as noted earlier, is that the net benet of an increase in the
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supply of specialized workers is muted, due to a smaller expansion in labor demand in
the innovation sector. The larger increase in the specialized unemployment rate in the
middle-income economy also results in a higher payroll contribution rate, which mitigates
the increase in labor demand and dampens steady-state growth. Nevertheless, despite
the increase in specialized unemployment, welfare improves for both types of economies
because employed untrained workers and both types of unemployed workers gain from
this policy. For the former, this is because wages are ultimately higher than initially. For
the unemployed, this is because unemployment benets are higher along the equilibrium
path, due to higher steady-state growth.
The negative correlation between the incentive to acquire skills and the supply of
specialized workers induced by a reduction in the cost of training, as predicted here, is
consistent with the evidence on the inverse association between increases in the number of
university graduates and the wage premium provided by Machin and McNally (2007) for
Spain one of the countries in our sample of high-income economies and New Zealand.
Although they do not link it explicitly with a government-induced, sustained reduction
in the real e¤ective cost of higher education (a broader interpretation of a lower  in the
experiment), the evidence for both countries is consistent with it.27
Evidence supportive of the possibility that more university graduates may lead to
higher open unemployment, as also predicted here, is more di¢ cult to come by for at
least three reasonswhich are equally relevant for high- and middle-income countries.
First, higher unemployment rates for new university graduates often result from mis-
matches between supply and demand for particular skills (for instance, liberal arts), or
low quality standards an important problem in Latin America, as noted by Yamada
(2015) rather than an across-the-board lack of demand for labor, as predicted by our
27Although we were unable to nd publicly available statistics on real e¤ective cost of higher education
and its evolution over time, in the case of Spain for instance, two specic educational policies Ley
Orgánica, de Reforma Universitaria in 1983 and "Informe sobre la nanciación de las universidades"
in 1994 led directly to the establishment of student nancial aid system and the reduction of tuition
fees. These, coupled with the large subsequent increase in the number of public universities (the total
number of universities increased from 35 in 1985 to 78 in 2010, and the majority of these are public
universities) would almost certainly result in a signicantly decrease in the real e¤ective cost of tertiary
education consistent with our experiment. In practice, however, an increase in the number of university
graduates may also result from improving high school enrollment and completion rates (especially for
middle-income countries) or sustained increases in per capita income, which translates into a higher
demand for education.
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experiment. Second, rather than open unemployment, in practice university graduates
may choose to be employed in occupations that do not fully exploit their skill levels,
which therefore translates into underemployment or disguised unemployment.28 Finally,
graduates may also choose to migrate abroad, a form of brain drain. Although the model
does not explicitly capture any of these possibilities it does nevertheless draw attention
to the adverse labor market e¤ects of an oversupply of skills, due to a low e¤ective cost of
education promoted by government subsidies. Social demands to expand access to higher
education may ultimately prove counterproductive.
7 Composite Reform Programs
The foregoing analysis suggests that reforms may entail dynamic trade-o¤s: they can have
adverse e¤ects on the labor market and growth in the short run, despite improving these
outcomes in the long run. This trade-o¤ could induce a government motivated by short-
term electoral considerations to postpone, or abandon altogether, the implementation
of structural reforms. In addition, growth and welfare may move in opposite directions
in the long run, as illustrated in the case of a reduction in the degree of indexation of
unemployment benets, and a cut in the trade unions mark-up on specialized workers
wage target. A natural issue to address therefore is to what extent a combination of
measures assuming that it is politically feasible can, by exploiting policy externalities,
mitigate the contrasting e¤ects associated with individual reforms.
Accordingly, we now consider alternative composite reform programs involving a com-
bination of the individual policies discussed earlier. In addition, we examine the extent to
which composite programs designed to reduce unemployment and promote growth would
benet from an increase in public infrastructure investment. This issue has been much
discussed in recent years, in the context of persistent, ultra-low interest rates in the global
economy.29
28The possibility that underemployment may result from overeducation is the subject of an extensive
microeconomic literature reviewed by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011), who also documented its incidence
in Europe and Latin America.
29The European Commission for instance has ambitious deployment targets for high-speed, ber-based
broadband networks in its 2020 strategy. Many observers have argued that public funding is necessary to
achieve ubiquitous coverage in remote and unprotable regions, as opposed to densely populated areas;
see Briglauer et al. (2016) for a discussion. In Latin America basic infrastructure needs (including core
internet access) remain large and calls for higher public investment have also been vocal; see Serebrisky
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7.1 Core Programs
Three core composite reform programs are considered rst. In all of them we assume that
the key objectives of policymakers are to reduce unemployment and to promote skills
acquisition to support innovation-driven growth. Given that the distribution of high-
ability individuals in the population is xed, the latter objective can be achieved only by
raising the productivity of those currently employed in the innovation sector, in order to
induce higher wages and reduce the misallocation of talent. The combination of policies
considered, although fairly targeted (given our focus on structural, rather than cyclical,
unemployment), is consistent with long-standing calls for comprehensive programs of labor
market reforms, as noted earlier.
The rst program, denoted Program A, consists of pure labor market reform measures,
which are the same in both countries in relative terms. It involves a cut in the minimum
wage, as measured by a 10 percent decrease in the shift parameter wU0 , a reduction in the
unemployment benet indexation parameters, U and S, by 6:25 percent (from 0:4 to
0:375), and a 37:5 percent cut in the unions untrained wage preference parameter U (a
drop from from 0:16 to 0:10 for the high-income economy and from 0:08 to 0:05 for the
middle-income economy).30
The second program, Program B1, adds human capital-promoting policies to these
measures, to exploit potential gains associated with a skills expansion. Specically, in
addition to the measures in Program A, Program B1 adds an increase in specialized
training time, as measured by ", and a 5 percent reduction in specialized training cost,
.31 The third program, Program C1, seeks to supplement the reforms implemented in B1
with an ambitious research productivity-enhancing measure implemented across all rms
in the innovation sector, which translates into a 36 percent increase in the probability of
being caught shirking, .32 The magnitude of all these policy changes is quite large to
et al. (2015) for instance.
30We consider an across-the-board cut in unemployment benet indexation, even though we assume that
reforms mainly target untrained unemployment, because this is the way these policies are implemented
in practice.
31For the high-income economy this translates into a rise in " from 0:1145 to 0:14, and a reduction in
 from 0:08 to 0:076. For the middle-income economy " rises from 0:123 to 0:15 and  falls from 0:120
to 0:114.
32Specically, for the high-income economy this translates into an increase in  from 0:078 to 0:106,
whereas for the middle-income economy  rises from 0:048 to 0:065.
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reect an ambitious reform agenda and by design, is largely consistent (except for ) with
the individual experiments reported earlier.
The impact and steady-state e¤ects of all three programs are shown in Table 5 whereas
the transitional dynamics for both types of economies are illustrated in Figures 3, 4 and
5. The transmission mechanism of the combined shocks is, naturally enough, a composite
of the features outlined earlier. The e¤ects of Program A, which consists of pure labor
market reforms, are clear: reductions in both untrained and specialized unemployment
rates in both the short and the long-run in the steady state the former (latter) drops by
6:5 percent (0:4 percent) for the high-income economy and 4:9 percent (0:1 percent) for
the middle-income economy reduced misallocation of talent, small gains in both overall
specialized workers and the proportion employed in the innovation sector (despite the
increase in wage premium), weak growth e¤ects, and a deterioration in social welfare.
This last result is largely due to the unemployed being worse o¤ from the benets cut,
given the small gain in long-run growth in output and income.
As expected, the results for Program B1 show a fairly signicant increase (reduction) in
the supply of specialized (untrained) workersof the order of 1:8 (2:5) percentage points for
the high income economy in the long-run, and 3:3 (4:2) in the middle-income economy
and reduced misallocation of talent. The middle-income economy registers greater gains in
these indicators largely due to a higher initial  value, and a lower initial base in terms of
specialized labor. By contrast, the high-income economy, with a relatively more e¢ cient
production structure, benets from higher gains in terms of the share of specialized labor
employed in the innovation sector and the growth rate of nal output, which increases by
0:4 percentage points. Nevertheless, the change in welfare remains negative in both cases,
and in the long run both types of economies su¤er from a higher unemployment rate for
specialized labor the oversupply problem discussed earlier.
The more ambitious Program C1 does better in the sense that, in addition to deliv-
ering higher growth of the order of 2:1 percentage points for the high-income economy
in the long run, and 0:6 points in the middle-income economy it lowers untrained un-
employment, reduces signicantly the misallocation of talent, and most importantly, also
leads to improved welfare outcomes for both types of economies compared to the other
programs. However, for the middle-income economy the specialized unemployment rate
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remains higher than in the initial steady state. Thus, the absorption problem noted earlier
persists, despite the introduction of a research productivity-enhancing measure.
In this setting, the response to this issue is to either a) lower supply, by reducing in-
centives to accumulate human capital, or b) expand demand, by implementing additional
policies. Regarding a), eliminating the reduction in the cost of training from Program
C1 obviously leads to lower specialized unemployment in the long run albeit at the cost
of lower growth.33 More interesting in the current economic context is to focus on b), by
considering next whether a concomitant increase in public investment may provide the
required stimulus.
7.2 Infrastructure Investment
We now consider whether comprehensive labor market reform programs perform better
when accompanied by an increase in public infrastructure investment. The important
point about this type of spending is that it has both demand-side e¤ects (in the short
run) and supply-side e¤ects (in the long run) by boosting directly the economys capacity
to produce and by stimulating private investment through a complementarity e¤ect. In
addition, improved access to infrastructure helps to promote innovation activity, especially
through a higher marginal product of capital. In addition, in our setting improved access
to infrastructure helps to promote innovation activity, especially through its impact on
knowledge networks, as emphasized in the recent literature.34 In that sense, therefore, the
provision of public capital is also a productivity-enhancing measure for research activities.
To examine this issue, two additional reform programs are considered: Programs B2
and C2, which add to Programs B1 and C1, respectively, a 20 percent increase in the share
of public spending on infrastructure, I , from 0:05 to 0:06 for the high-income economy
and from 0:069 to 0:083 for the middle-income economy. The impact and long-run e¤ects
are shown also in Table 5 and the transitional dynamics are displayed in Figures 6 and 7.
The results show that for both B2 and C2 the absorption problem associated with
33Specically, for the middle-income economy the specialized unemployment rate drops by 0:5 percent-
age points and growth increases by 0:4 percentage points. The full results are not reported here to save
space.
34See Agénor (2016) and the references therein. The e¤ects of an increase in public investment, consid-
ered in isolation, are shown in Tables 3 and 4; these e¤ects are faily muted in the case of the middle-income
economy and show again conicting e¤ects on growth and welfare.
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specialized labor is slightly mitigated. In fact, for Program C2 the specialized unemploy-
ment rate now declines both in the short and in the long run for the high-income economy
(by about 0:2 percentage points in the long run), nal output growth is higher (by 2:6
percentage points in the long run), and welfare improves. However, for the middle-income
economy specialized unemployment still increases for both programs, by more than 2:0
percentage points in the long run.
As noted earlier, addressing the labor absorption issue could be achieved by mitigating
incentives to acquire skills (namely, by keeping the cost of training high). The question
here is whether more aggressive policies aimed at increasing labor demand in both the
innovation and nal good sectors can prevent a rise in specialized unemployment even
when training costs are lowered as before. Indeed, consider Program C2 and suppose
that public investment in infrastructure is now increased from 2:0 percent of GDP to 6:2
percent which translates into an increase in I from 6:9 percent of noninterest public ex-
penditure to 21:0 percent a value consistent with the upper range of estimates reported
by Serebrisky et al. (2015, p. 7) and deemed necessary in a number of policy reports
to eliminate Latin Americas infrastructure gap with respect to East Asia.. In addition,
suppose that through governance reforms public investment e¢ ciency, as measured by ',
is increased in all countries from 0:4 to the level of Brazils, as estimated by Dabla-Norris
et al. (2012, Table 1), that is, 0:78, and that labor productivity in the innovation sec-
tor is increased by raising research monitoring intensity to the same baseline level of the
high-income economy (that is, an increase in  from 0:048 to 0:078, instead of 0:065).
The higher stock of public capital contributes to higher productivity in both the nal
good and innovation sectors (with the latter also beneting from increased monitoring
intensity), which improves the middle-income economys ability to absorb specialized la-
bor. However, despite higher long-run growth and welfare, this program is still unable to
generate a large drop in specialized unemployment.35 Moreover, it is an open question as
to whether, in practice, a program involving a permanent increase in the ratio of invest-
ment to GDP to more than 6 percent is sustainable politically. The broader lesson from
this experiment is therefore that in middle-income economies ambitious reforms aimed
35Specically, in the long run the specialized unemployment rate drops by 0:1 percentage points (com-
pared to -6.6 points for untrained labor), while growth increases by 6:8 percentage points and welfare by
4:9 percentage points. Again, the full results are not reported here to save space.
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at increasing e¢ ciency, both in the public and private sector, are important to promote
labor demand and growth, but that caution is also needed in promoting higher education
through reductions in tuition fees, to avoid creating an oversupply of specialized workers.
In many of these countries, improving the quality of education may prove more e¤ective.
It is worth noting also from Figures 3 to 7 that the transitional dynamics associ-
ated with the composite programs, with or without public investment in infrastructure,
are largely monotonic, except for the growth rate of output which follows an inverted
U-shape growth accelerates during the rst phase of the transition, but slows down
gradually in the second phase. In addition, the adjustment path is very similar for all
the variables shown in the gures except for the wage premium and the specialized un-
employment rate for the middle-income economy when public investment is added to the
composite labor market reform programs.
The U-shape path of output growth largely reects the composition of the reform
programs. During the rst phase of the transition, the e¤ects of policy reforms on skills
expansion and employment tend to dominate. The easing of labor market rigidities (re-
ductions in the minimum wage and union bargaining power) and active labor market
policies (cut in training cost) raise incentives to acquire advanced skills. At the same
time, the drop in the marginal cost of hiring specialized labor leads to the hiring of more
of that type of workers in the nal good and innovation sectors. In the case of the latter,
these reforms complement the policy aimed to improve research monitoring intensity and
the expansion of innovation activity. The combination of these e¤ects translates into a
sharp growth acceleration. During the second phase of the transition, however, these ef-
fects are mitigated. The labor market reforms lead to an overshooting in specialized wages
and therefore to too much specialized labor in the economy, outpacing the expansion in
demand and thereby putting downward pressure on specialized wages. At the same time,
the marginal product of untrained labor in the nal good sector improves, thereby raising
the e¤ective wage of that category of workers. This leads to a reduction in incentives to
acquire skills, and a reduced supply of specialized labor which in turn rekindles upward
pressure on specialized wages and translates into reduced labor demand in the innovation
sector. The expansion of intermediate varieties therefore decelerates over time, resulting
in a gradual slowdown in output growth.
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7.3 Policy Externalities
Finally, a question worth asking is to what extent composite reform programs generate
long-run gains that exceed those generated by independent policies? This issue can be
addressed in a simple manner by adding up the steady-state results for each individual
policy in a composite program with respect to a particular set of variables, and compar-
ing the aggregate numbers with those reported in Table 5 for the relevant program. The
di¤erence between the latter and the sum of individual e¤ects gives a measure of inter-
actions between reforms and (depending on its sign) whether they complement or o¤set
each other, that is, whether policy externalities are positive or negative.
For Program C2 for instance, for the high-income economy the sum of partial e¤ects
gives a total of 0:0227 for the growth rate (compared to 0:0261 in Table 5),  0:0686 for
the aggregate unemployment rate (compared to  0:0551) and 0:0619 for social welfare
(compared to 0:0186). For the middle-income economy and for the same program, the
sum of partial e¤ects gives 0:0065 for the growth rate (compared to 0:0083),  0:0513 for
the aggregate unemployment rate (compared to  0:0384), and 0:0431 for social welfare
(compared to 0:0280). These comparisons suggest therefore that whether externalities are
positive or negative the benets of comprehensive programs depend on which outcomes
one chooses to focus on; in terms of growth, integrated programs perform better because
they generate positive externalities. In terms of unemployment or welfare, however, in-
tegrated programs perform worse.36 Intuitively, policies aimed at cutting unemployment
benets and diluting union bargaining power for untrained workers tend to be associated
with drops in wages and consumption for the unemployed and untrained groupsdespite
the fact that they are complementary to other policies in promoting innovation and spe-
cialized employment. Similarly, while combining either skills expansion policies (cuts in
training cost) or productivity-enhancing measures (improvement in research monitoring)
with conventional labor market policies tends to create positive externalities in terms of
growth and talent allocation, these policies also produce counteracting e¤ects on the spe-
cialized wage premium. Consequently, instead of a complementarity e¤ect, they generate
a negative externality which contributes to weaker outcomes for the composite program
36Similar results hold for the other composite programs considered earlier. They are not reported here
to save space.
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in terms of its impact on (untrained) unemployment and social welfare.
8 Concluding Remarks
The main implications of this paper were summarized in the introduction and need not be
repeated here. We therefore conclude by pointing out that the model could be extended
to account for other types of labor market distortions, such as state-contingent ring costs
and severance payments, deskilling of the labor force associated with unemployment, as
well as a positive e¤ect of a higher share of more educated workers on life expectancy and
savings (and thus on economic growth), and various other forms of active labor market
policies (see Almeida et al. (2012)). In particular, hiring and ring regulations, and hiring
costs, have been shown to have an adverse e¤ect on unemployment, especially when search
and matching considerations are important;37 their implications for growth and welfare,
however, are less well understood.
A more systematic e¤ort to integrate political economy considerations in assessing
the performance of labor market reforms in growth models would also be warranted.
Observers have often argued that the costs of these reforms are incurred up front and
concentrated on specic groups, whereas their benets materialize later and are both
more di¤use and less predictably allocated among workers and households. In addition,
conicting growth and welfare e¤ects may well lead to organized resistance to reform. A
key challenge then is to create the political consensus needed to confront powerful vested
interests and mitigate dynamic trade-o¤s between (short-term) costs and (longer-term)
gains.
At the same time, if specic labor market reforms do not produce substantial eco-
nomic benets as suggested by our numerical experiments political viability may well
require reform programs to eschew them and focus instead on upfront measures that
matter more for productivity, especially in research and innovation. Put di¤erently, with
limited political capital and little capacity to compensate losers in the short run, pursuing
a wide array of labor market reforms at once may prove costly and ine¤ective. Moreover,
even when there is broad support for reform, weak administrative capacity and inade-
37See Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012) and Millána et al. (2014) for some supportive evidence. However,
other studies provide a mixed picture; see International Labour O¢ ce (2012) for a discussion.
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quate governance key constraints in many middle-income countries militate in favor of
a narrow reform agenda. While a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this
paper, they deserve greater attention going forward.
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Table 1
Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark Case
Parameter Description High Middle
Income Income
Households
 Intergenerational discount rate 0:375 0:375
 Household savings rate 0:109 0:138
 Productivity parameter (e¢ ciency of training) 0:9 0:5
 Advanced education cost 0:08 0:12
" Time allocated to schooling activity 0:115 0:123
Final good
! Elasticity wrt public-private capital ratio 0:17 0:24
S Elasticity wrt specialized workers 0:3 0:35
U Elasticity wrt untrained workers 0:3 0:2
 Elasticity wrt private capital 0:3 0:35
 Elasticity wrt intermediate input 0:1 0:1
Intermediate goods
 Substitution parameter, intermediate goods 0:61 0:25
Innovation sector
R1 Elasticity wrt public infrastructure 0:186 0:300
 Probability of being caught shirking 0:078 0:048
R Elasticity wrt wage for innovation 0:9 0:9
 Elasticity of production wrt labor input 0:6 0:6
 Elasticity of e¤ort wrt relative wages 0:70 0:43
Government
 Tax rate on total wages 0:198 0:123
I Share of spending on infrastructure 0:050 0:069
' E¢ ciency parameter, public investment 0:5 0:4
Labor market
S Specialized labor, unemp. benet indexation 0:4 0:4
U Untrained labor, unemp. benet indexation 0:4 0:4
U Relative weight, untrained workers 0:06 0:08
SY Relative weight, specialized workers 0:06 0:08
wU0 Minimum wage indexation, untrained workers 0:522 0:546
wSY0 Minimum wage indexation, specialized workers 0:740 0:699
{U Elasticity wrt unemployment, untrained wage 0:12 0:12
{S Elasticity wrt unemployment, specialized wage 0:12 0:12
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Table 2
Initial Steady-State Values of Key Variables
Variable Description High Middle
Income Income
U Share of untrained workers in population 0:732 0:795
S Share of e¤ective specialized workers in population 0:232 0:184
SR Share of e¤ective specialized workers in innovation sector 0:019 0:004
SY Share of e¤ective specialized workers in nal good sector 0:145 0:109
UY Share of untrained workers in nal good sector 0:606 0:708
UL Untrained unemployment rate 0:126 0:087
SL Specialized unemployment rate 0:068 0:071
(R SR)=SY Index of misallocation of talent 0:189 0:392
SL Probability of specialized workers getting unemployed 0:293 0:385
SY Prob. of specialized workers employed in nal good sector 0:623 0:593
SR Prob. of specialized workers employed in innovation sector 0:084 0:022
UL Prob. of untrained workers getting unemployed 0:172 0:110
UY Prob. of untrained workers getting employed 0:828 0:890
& Firmspayroll contribution rate 0:126 0:052
wU=wSweighted Relative wage ratio 0:550 0:750
kG Public-private capital ratio 0:189 0:147
Y=KP Final output-private capital ratio 0:286 0:429
m Stock of innovation-private capital ratio 0:100 0:100
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Table 3
Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7320 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0019 0.0013 0.0028
Effective share of specialized workers 0.2321 0.0006 0.0022 0.0006 0.0014 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0020
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0194 0.0001 0.0008 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003
Expected wage premium 0.8182 0.0062 0.0181 0.0140 0.0116 ‐0.0168 ‐0.0082
Index of misallocation of talent 0.1890 ‐0.0018 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0027 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0028 ‐0.0021
Untrained unemployment rate 0.1260 ‐0.0115 ‐0.0278 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0007
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0680 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0014 ‐0.0025
Total unemployment rate 0.1058 ‐0.0082 ‐0.0199 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0044 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0011
Payroll contribution rate 0.1260 ‐0.0052 ‐0.0212 ‐0.0064 ‐0.0137 ‐0.0037 ‐0.0072
Growth rate of final output 0.0080 0.0073 0.0010 ‐0.0050 0.0006 ‐0.0061 0.0003
Social welfare 1.0000 0.0046 ‐0.0872 ‐0.1667
Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7320 0.0005 0.0008 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0016 0.0006 0.0013
Effective share of specialized workers 0.2321 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0006 0.0003 0.0012 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0009
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0194 0.0006 0.0008 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001
Expected wage premium 0.8182 ‐0.0028 0.0034 0.0032 0.0095 ‐0.0079 ‐0.0038
Index of misallocation of talent 0.1890 ‐0.0055 ‐0.0078 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0047 ‐0.0047 ‐0.0048
Untrained unemployment rate 0.1260 ‐0.0017 ‐0.0065 ‐0.0060 ‐0.0147 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0003
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0680 ‐0.0018 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0036 ‐0.0042
Total unemployment rate 0.1058 ‐0.0017 ‐0.0054 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0105 ‐0.0010 ‐0.0012
Payroll contribution rate 0.1260 ‐0.0102 ‐0.0206 ‐0.0027 ‐0.0113 ‐0.0017 ‐0.0033
Growth rate of final output 0.0080 ‐0.0111 0.0009 0.0038 0.0005 0.0094 0.0001
Social welfare 1.0000 ‐0.2383 0.0024 ‐0.0185
Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7320 ‐0.0024 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0098 ‐0.0224 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0012
Effective share of specialized workers 0.2321 0.0018 0.0043 0.0071 0.0161 0.0004 0.0009
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0194 0.0039 0.0047 0.0012 0.0029 0.0019 0.0021
Expected wage premium 0.8182 0.0477 0.0361 ‐0.0504 ‐0.0988 0.0100 0.0079
Index of misallocation of talent 0.1890 ‐0.0272 ‐0.0332 ‐0.0098 ‐0.0235 ‐0.0128 ‐0.0143
Untrained unemployment rate 0.1260 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0069 ‐0.0033 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0018
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0680 ‐0.0021 ‐0.0013 0.0048 0.0102 ‐0.0014 ‐0.0013
Total unemployment rate 0.1058 ‐0.0017 ‐0.0054 ‐0.0013 ‐0.0084 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0017
Payroll contribution rate 0.1260 ‐0.0037 ‐0.0096 0.0004 ‐0.0048 ‐0.0013 ‐0.0032
Growth rate of final output 0.0080 0.0078 0.0125 0.0010 0.0027 0.0346 0.0031
Social welfare 1.0000 0.1865 0.0075 0.0027
 */ The respective individual policy shocks are: Reduction in wU₀ by 5 percent; κU reduced by 10 percent; 
      κS reduced by 10 percent; both κU and κS cut by 10 percent; ξU reduced by 37.5 percent; ξSY reduced by 37.5 percent;
      translates to an increase in probability of getting caught shirking by 28.6 percent; decrease in advanced education cost by 5 percent; 
      and an increase in share of public infrastructure investment by 20 percent.
 Source: Authors' calculations.
High‐Income Economy: Summary of Benchmark Individual Policy Experiments*
Higher Labor Productivity      
in Innovation
Advanced Education          
Cost Cut   
Increase in Public 
Infrastructure Investment
Reduction in Base Minimum 
Wage  
Reduction in Untrained 
Workers' UB Indexation   
Reduction in Specialized 
Workers' UB Indexation   
Reduction in both UB 
Indexation Parameters
Reduction in Untrained 
Workers' Union Mark‐up
Reduction in Specialized 
Workers' Union Mark‐up   
[Absolute deviations from baseline]
Table 4
Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7950 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0014 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0007 0.0010 0.0023
Effective share of specialized workers 0.1840 0.0004 0.0011 0.0003 0.0006 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0019
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0040 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
Expected wage premium 0.3333 0.0021 0.0076 0.0055 0.0038 ‐0.0214 ‐0.0155
Index of misallocation of talent 0.3922 ‐0.0010 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0020 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0003
Untrained unemployment rate 0.0870 ‐0.0085 ‐0.0201 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0016 0.0000 0.0001
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0710 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0019
Total unemployment rate 0.0791 ‐0.0065 ‐0.0154 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0003
Payroll contribution rate 0.0520 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0073 ‐0.0020 ‐0.0037 ‐0.0018 ‐0.0032
Growth rate of final output 0.0390 0.0033 0.0001 ‐0.0020 0.0001 ‐0.0064 0.0001
Social welfare 1.0000 0.0040 ‐0.0761 ‐0.2216
Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7950 0.0007 0.0016 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0010 0.0005 0.0012
Effective share of specialized workers 0.1840 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0013 0.0003 0.0008 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0009
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0040 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Expected wage premium 0.3333 ‐0.0160 ‐0.0117 0.0016 0.0056 ‐0.0106 ‐0.0077
Index of misallocation of talent 0.3922 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0029 ‐0.0120 ‐0.0120
Untrained unemployment rate 0.0870 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0063 ‐0.0150 0.0000 0.0000
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0710 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0018 0.0001 0.0001 ‐0.0038 ‐0.0044
Total unemployment rate 0.0791 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0048 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0007
Payroll contribution rate 0.0520 ‐0.0038 ‐0.0069 ‐0.0014 ‐0.0054 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0016
Growth rate of final output 0.0390 ‐0.0082 0.0001 0.0024 0.0001 0.0149 0.0000
Social welfare 1.0000 ‐0.2788 0.0030 ‐0.0256
Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7950 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0013 ‐0.0192 ‐0.0426 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0003
Effective share of specialized workers 0.1840 0.0004 0.0010 0.0151 0.0330 0.0001 0.0002
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0040 0.0013 0.0014 0.0007 0.0015 0.0006 0.0006
Expected wage premium 0.3333 0.0095 0.0066 ‐0.0834 ‐0.1608 0.0021 0.0014
Index of misallocation of talent 0.3922 ‐0.0120 ‐0.0129 ‐0.0134 ‐0.0273 ‐0.0053 ‐0.0055
Untrained unemployment rate 0.0870 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0010 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0196 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0003
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0710 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0004 0.0124 0.0274 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004
Total unemployment rate 0.0791 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0079 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0003
Payroll contribution rate 0.0520 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0011 0.0017 0.0026 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0004
Growth rate of final output 0.0390 0.0018 0.0033 0.0044 0.0012 0.0496 0.0009
Social welfare 1.0000 0.1334 0.0610 ‐0.0019
 */ The respective individual policy shocks are: Reduction in wU₀ by 5 percent; κU reduced by 10 percent; 
      κS reduced by 10 percent; both κU and κS cut by 10 percent; ξU reduced by 37.5 percent;  ξSY reduced by 37.5 percent;  
      translates to an increase in probability of getting caught shirking by 28.6 percent; decrease in advanced education cost by 5 percent;
      and an increase in share of public infrastructure investment by 20 percent.
 Source: Authors' calculations.
Middle‐Income Economy: Summary of Benchmark Individual Policy Experiments*
Increase in Public 
Infrastructure Investment
Advanced Education          
Cost Cut   
Higher Labor Productivity      
in Innovation
Reduction in Base Minimum 
Wage
Reduction in Untrained 
Workers' UB Indexation
Reduction in Specialized 
Workers' UB Indexation
Reduction in Specialized 
Workers' Union Mark‐up   
Reduction in Untrained 
Workers' Union Mark‐up
Reduction in both UB 
Indexation Parameters    
[Absolute deviations from baseline]
Table 5
High‐Income Economy Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7320 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0056 ‐0.0101 ‐0.0248 ‐0.0106 ‐0.0261 ‐0.0131 ‐0.0327 ‐0.0138 ‐0.0346
Effective share of specialized workers 0.2321 0.0011 0.0041 0.0073 0.0179 0.0077 0.0188 0.0095 0.0234 0.0100 0.0248
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0194 0.0007 0.0023 0.0012 0.0043 0.0033 0.0068 0.0061 0.0109 0.0087 0.0142
Expected wage premium 0.8182 0.0125 0.0402 ‐0.0047 ‐0.0270 0.0058 ‐0.0190 0.0557 0.0186 0.0721 0.0315
Index of misallocation of talent 0.1890 ‐0.0077 ‐0.0228 ‐0.0166 ‐0.0424 ‐0.0296 ‐0.0581 ‐0.0486 ‐0.0845 ‐0.0652 ‐0.1057
Untrained unemployment rate 0.1260 ‐0.0288 ‐0.0651 ‐0.0312 ‐0.0736 ‐0.0316 ‐0.0746 ‐0.0326 ‐0.0781 ‐0.0331 ‐0.0795
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0680 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0006 0.0011 ‐0.0021 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0049 ‐0.0023
Total unemployment rate 0.1058 ‐0.0207 ‐0.0467 ‐0.0222 ‐0.0505 ‐0.0228 ‐0.0516 ‐0.0238 ‐0.0537 ‐0.0246 ‐0.0551
Payroll contribution rate 0.1260 ‐0.0185 ‐0.0544 ‐0.0191 ‐0.0566 ‐0.0203 ‐0.0586 ‐0.0229 ‐0.0627 ‐0.0245 ‐0.0653
Growth rate of final output 0.0080 0.0105 0.0026 0.0110 0.0038 0.0461 0.0073 0.0202 0.0208 0.0551 0.0261
Social welfare 1.0000 ‐0.1471 ‐0.1738 ‐0.1717 0.0153 0.0186
Middle‐Income Economy Steady state
value Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State Impact  Steady State
Share of untrained workers  0.7950 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0021 ‐0.0192 ‐0.0421 ‐0.0194 ‐0.0426 ‐0.0201 ‐0.0444 ‐0.0203 ‐0.0452
Effective share of specialized workers 0.1840 0.0007 0.0017 0.0151 0.0326 0.0152 0.0329 0.0157 0.0343 0.0159 0.0349
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.0040 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 0.0017 0.0014 0.0025 0.0026 0.0041 0.0036 0.0054
Expected wage premium 0.3333 ‐0.0051 0.0098 ‐0.0666 ‐0.1349 ‐0.0644 ‐0.1336 ‐0.0541 ‐0.1267 ‐0.0500 ‐0.1242
Index of misallocation of talent 0.3922 ‐0.0037 ‐0.0099 ‐0.0254 ‐0.0439 ‐0.0313 ‐0.0512 ‐0.0420 ‐0.0650 ‐0.0505 ‐0.0758
Untrained unemployment rate 0.0870 ‐0.0225 ‐0.0487 ‐0.0256 ‐0.0588 ‐0.0257 ‐0.0590 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0595 ‐0.0260 ‐0.0598
Specialized unemployment rate 0.0710 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0007 0.0087 0.0220 0.0082 0.0215 0.0076 0.0212 0.0068 0.0205
Total unemployment rate 0.0791 ‐0.0173 ‐0.0374 ‐0.0174 ‐0.0376 ‐0.0176 ‐0.0378 ‐0.0178 ‐0.0381 ‐0.0180 ‐0.0384
Payroll contribution rate 0.0520 ‐0.0071 ‐0.0200 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0161 ‐0.0061 ‐0.0164 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0172 ‐0.0069 ‐0.0177
Growth rate of final output 0.0390 0.0034 0.0004 0.0072 0.0013 0.0577 0.0024 0.0093 0.0064 0.0596 0.0083
Social welfare 1.0000 ‐0.1673 ‐0.1169 ‐0.1180 0.0305 0.0280
*/  Program A includes  a decrease in κS by 6.25 percent;  a decrease in κU by 6.25 percent; a decrease in wU0 by 10 percent; and a reduction in untrained union mark‐up by 37.5 percent. 
      Program B1 includes a decrease in μ by 5 percent; an increase in advanced education period by 22 percent; a decrease in κS by 6.25 percent; a decrease in κU by 6.25 percent; 
      a decrease in wU₀ by 10 percent; and a reduction in untrained union mark‐up by 37.5 percent; 
      Program B2 adds an increase in public infrastructure investment by 20 percent to Program B1.
      Program C1 adds to Program B1, the implementation of performance management measures leading to an improved labor productivity in innovation (increase in  π 
      by 36 percent). Program C2 adds a positive infrastructure investment shock by 20 percent to Program C1.
 Source: Authors' calculations.
Summary of Benchmark Composite Reform Programs*
[Absolute deviations from baseline]
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Individual and Composite Experiments: Steady-state effects
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Source: Authors' calculation.
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Composite Reform Program A 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 4
Composite Reform Program B1 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 5
Composite Reform Program C1 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 6
Composite Reform Program B2 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 7
Composite Reform Program C2 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Specialized-untrained wage premium
Time
Payroll contribution rate Growth rate of final output
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Index of misallocation of talent Share of specialized workers in innovation
Untrained unemployment rate
Specialized unemployment rate
High-income economy Middle-income economy
10 20 30 40 50 60
10 20 30 40 50 60
10 20 30 40 50 60
10 20 30 40 50 60
10 30 40 50 6020
10 30 40 50 6020
10 30 40 50 6020
10 30 40 50 6020
